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rate regimes and GDP growth finds that growth is higher under stable currency-value regimes.
Significant asymmetric effects on country growth from not doing what is said are found for
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In this paper, we propose using a familiar econometric procedure to obtain de facto
classi￿cations of national exchange rate policy. We then use this de facto classi￿cation to
investigate the role of exchange rate regimes in growth and whether di⁄erences between
what countries say and what they do matter for growth. Accurate and meaningful
classi￿cations of a country￿ s currency management are crucial for assessing the merits
between ￿xed and ￿ oating exchange rates. Until recently, empirical research employed
the de jure classi￿cation, which largely re￿ ects the self-reported regime submitted by a
country￿ s central bank to the International Monetary Fund. However, observers have
noted that for many countries, de facto management of currencies seems at odds with
their de jure management.1 As a result of such discrepancies, the de jure classi￿cation
has been viewed as unsatisfactory for assessing the role of exchange rate stability in
economic performance and has motivated researchers to propose de facto exchange rate
classi￿cations that are based on observed properties of the foreign exchange market data.
In￿ uential contributions include the pioneering work of Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004)
(hereafter RR) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) (hereafter LYS). RR argue
that a natural classi￿cation of exchange rate regimes should be based on the behavior
of the parallel market exchange rates on the grounds that they better re￿ ect underlying
market and monetary conditions than do the country￿ s o¢ cial exchange rates. LYS,
on the other hand, advocate the use of a k-means cluster sorting algorithm to assign
countries to the various exchange rate regimes.2
The idea that underlies our classi￿cation method goes like this. It must be the case
that many countries actually do what they say and that the regime they report results
1Reference to potential inconsistencies between de jure and de facto regimes dates back at least to
Frankel and Wei (1995). While some de jure exchange rate ￿xers may appear to be de facto ￿ oaters
due to frequent changes in their peg, others that are de jure ￿ oaters appear to be de facto ￿xers since
they maintain very stable exchange rates￿ a phenomenon that Calvo and Reinhart (2002) refer to as
￿ fear of ￿ oating.￿
2Assessing the role of a country￿ s exchange rate regime in economic performance is an active area
of research. The LYS classi￿cations have been used by Juhn and Mauro (2002), who explore the
long-run determinants of exchange rate regimes, Bordo and Flandreau (2001), who examine the link
between ￿nancial depth and exchange rate regimes, Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2002) who use it
to examine the link between regime choice and local interest rate sensitivity, Edwards and Levy-Yeyati
(2003) and Broda (2004), who analyze the impact of terms of trade on economic performance under
di⁄erent regimes. Both the LYS and RR regime classi￿cations are used by Alesina and Wagner (2003)
to ￿nd the politico-economic institutional qualities of countries with di⁄erent exchange rate regimes.
RR is employed by Reinhart, Rogo⁄ and Savastano (2003), who attempt to correlate the degree of
exchange rate ￿ exibility and degree and type of ￿nancial dollarization and Rogo⁄ et.al (2004), who
explore economic performance under alternative regimes.
2from thoughtful assessments of perceived, economically relevant exchange rate stabil-
ity. Under this supposition, we model the de jure responses econometrically and use
estimation of the systematic component of the response to create the de facto classi-
￿cation. The unsystematic component￿ the error term￿ thus captures the unobservable
factors that in￿ uence some countries to announce an exchange rate policy that di⁄ers
from the one that is implemented.
The model that we employ for this purpose views the de jure classi￿cations as out-
comes of a multinomial logit choice problem conditional on measures of volatility in
the country￿ s e⁄ective exchange rate, its bilateral exchange rate against an appropriate
anchor currency, and international reserves. As one of the determinants of the choice
problem is the volatility of the country￿ s e⁄ective exchange rate, we refer to our de facto
regime assignments as the ￿ e⁄ective￿exchange rate regime classi￿cation. Country-year
observations are then assigned to the regime with the highest predictive probability,
which we obtain from the multinomial logit, to create a de facto ￿ e⁄ective￿exchange
rate regime classi￿cation.3 This approach has three attractive features. First, classi￿er
judgment is required primarily in selecting the variables to be included in the economet-
rics. Modifying and updating the classi￿cations becomes straightforward since one only
needs to adjust or update the data employed in estimation of the choice problem. Sec-
ond, the optimization criteria of our approach is familiar as it is based on the likelihood
principle and has well-known properties. Here, the di¢ culties associated with ￿ incon-
clusive￿observations is much less problematic. Third, it is feasible with our method to
include a potentially large number of regime determinants.4
A novel aspect of our paper worth emphasizing is our use of e⁄ective exchange rate
volatility as one of the classi￿cation determinants whereas previous research has typically
emphasized the properties of a bilateral exchange rate against an anchor currency. For
a small open economy in a multilateral world, there are at least three reasons why the
behavior of the e⁄ective exchange rate might in￿ uence the generalized assessment of
currency stability. First, consider countries that maintain a hard bilateral peg. Unless
3The predictive probabilities can also be used to construct the mean regime choice to serve as a
continuous index of the country￿ s exchange rate regime.
4Limiting the role of the classi￿er￿ s judgment can be an advantage over RR￿ s methodology: Because
it is heavily dependent on their judgment, future research with their classi￿cations may require RR to
provide updates. The econometrics of our approach has some advantages over LYS￿ s cluster analysis.
LYS￿ s method attempts to sort countries into exchange rate regimes by minimizing the unweighted
average of within group sum of squared deviations from the group mean over each country charac-
teristic yielded 698 inconclusive country-year observations and is feasible only when the set of regime
determinants is small. Moreover, the optimality properties of their method are not well understood.
3they trade exclusively with the anchor currency country or within a bloc that pegs to the
same anchor, the e⁄ective exchange rate will exhibit more instability than the bilateral
exchange rate. Argentina is a case in point. Its operation of the currency board made it a
hard ￿xer to the US dollar. However, in 2000 only 16 percent of its trade was with the US
whereas 27 percent was with Brazil, 7 percent with Chile and 4 percent with Germany.
As a result, its e⁄ective exchange rate during this time exhibited substantially more
instability than the peso-US dollar rate.5 Second, consider those countries that engage
in relatively little trade with the anchor country. For these countries, the instability in
the bilateral rate against the anchor may be relatively unimportant. In fact, we ￿nd that
in approximately half of the observations the volatility of the e⁄ective exchange rate lies
below that of the bilateral exchange rate. Third, the multilateral approach to assessing
exchange rate stability can be motivated as central banks increasingly diversify their
reserve holdings away from the US dollar denominated assets, as recently announced by
the Bank of Korea.6
Having obtained these e⁄ective classi￿cations, we use them to study the impact
of exchange rate regimes on GDP growth. Economic theory does not have clear-cut
predictions about how the exchange rate regime a⁄ects growth. Typically, analysis of
the trade-o⁄s associated with ￿xed versus ￿ exible exchange rates are conducted in terms
of the regime￿ s e⁄ect on stabilization and trade and their e⁄ect on growth is imperfectly
understood. Empirical ￿ndings on relation between the exchange rate regime and output
growth reported in the literature are also mixed. Broadly speaking, Ghosh et. al. (2002)
who use the de jure classi￿cations, and RR report that higher growth is associated
with the more stable currency value regimes. LYS, on the other hand, ￿nd that higher
growth is associated with more exchange rate ￿ exibility where the highest growth rate
is associated with ￿ oaters, followed by ￿xers then intermediates. When we estimate
panel data growth regressions using the e⁄ective regimes and a standard set of growth
determinants, we ￿nd that higher growth is associated with ￿xed exchange rate regimes.
This result is driven mainly by the experience of nonindustrialized countries since we ￿nd
that industrial country growth is not signi￿cantly related to the exchange rate regime.
5Over our full sample (1971 to 2002), Argentina￿ s e⁄ective exchange rate volatility measured as the
annualized standard deviation of monthly percent changes, was 25.9 percent whereas the volatility of
the peso-dollar rate was 18.3 percent. While for hard ￿xers, the e⁄ective exchange rate is clearly more
volatile than the bilateral exchange rate we ￿nd in general that there is no presumption regarding
the volatility ranking between bilateral and e⁄ective exchange rates. We have about as many of our
country-year observations exhibit e⁄ective exchange rate volatility that lies below bilateral exchange
rate volatility as those that lie above.
6New York Times, Feb 22, 2005.
4We also examine whether di⁄erences between what a country says and what it does
matters for growth. Genberg and Swoboda (2004) hypothesize an asymmetry between
countries that say they ￿x but ￿ oat and for countries that say they ￿ oat but ￿x. A
de jure ￿xer that ￿ oats de facto is breaking a promise to maintain a stable currency
value and might be expected to be punished with inferior growth. On the other hand,
a de jure ￿ oater that ￿xes de facto￿ one that exhibits fear of ￿ oating￿ does not violate
any such agreement. Instead, it comes in above expectations by delivering exchange rate
performance that is superior to what was promised and might be expected to be rewarded
with superior growth outcomes. We ￿nd evidence in support of these hypothesized
asymmetries. For nonindustrialized countries, we ￿nd growth to be signi￿cantly higher
for de jure ￿ oaters who e⁄ectively ￿x de facto. These countries therefore have a direct
motive to display fear of ￿ oating if it results in signi￿cantly faster growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an informal
analysis of bilateral and e⁄ective exchange rates that highlights the di⁄erence in behavior
between them. Section 2 presents our regime-choice model and discusses features of our
e⁄ective exchange rate classi￿cations. Section 3 contains our analysis of the relationship
between the exchange rate regime and growth and Section 4 concludes. A description
of the data, variable construction and sources is contained in the Appendix.
1 Properties of e⁄ective and bilateral exchange rates
Our task, as well as the task confronting the authorities, is to classify country exchange
rate policy according to the de jure categories [see Ghosh et. al. (2000)] which we arrange
in order of increasing stability.
1. Independently ￿ oating
2. Managed ￿ oating
3. Adjusted according to a set of indicators
4. Cooperative arrangements
5. Limited ￿ exibility
6. Currency peg
5Typically, researchers have emphasized the properties of the bilateral exchange rate of
an anchor currency in connection with regimes classi￿cation.7 The informal comparison
between e⁄ective and bilateral nominal exchange rates presented in this section shows
that a very di⁄erent picture about both the level and the volatility of a country￿ s currency
value can emerge depending on whether it is viewed through the lens of a bilateral
or a multilateral exchange rate. Their properties are su¢ ciently di⁄erent for us to
conclude that the e⁄ective exchange rate contains information beyond that contained
in the bilateral exchange rate that is relevant for a country in announcing the de jure
regime that describes how it manages its currency.
Anchor currencies for bilateral exchange rates are either the U.S. dollar, the British
pound, the French franc, or the German mark. For this, we follow the country as-
signment used in LYS. Because e⁄ective exchange rate series do not exist for most
nonindustrialized countries, these data are constructed by us.8
We divide our discussion between an examination of the volatility of the alternative
exchange rate measures and a comparison of their dynamics.
1.1 Volatility
We measure volatility as the annual sample standard deviation of monthly percentage
changes in the exchange rate. The e⁄ective and bilateral exchange rate will exhibit the
same degree of stability only if the country does all of its trade with the country to
which it ￿xes or trades only with countries that also ￿x to the same currency. Such
may approximately be the case for the Bahamas, which is a hard ￿xer to the US dollar
and who in 2000 did 86 percent of its trade with the U.S., but this is an extreme case.
Other counties that pegged to the dollar include Panama, who in 2000 conducted 40
7See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003),
Shambaugh (2004).
8We begin with aggregated trade data obtained from the United Nation￿ s Comtrade database. These
are imports and exports according to SITC rev.1 commodity classi￿cation or SITC rev.2 data when SITC
rev.1 was not available for a particular country/year. For each reporting country i = 1;:::;180 and year
(t = 1971;:::;2002), set of weights are formed by taking trade between country i and j as a fraction
of country i￿ s total trade for that year. These weights are used to construct the geometric average of
respective bilateral nominal exchange rates and normalized such that their value in December 2000 is





wijt where NEERimt is the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate for country
i at month m of year t, BNEijmt is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and j at
month m of year t calculated as the relative rates per U.S. dollar, wijt is the trade weight between
county i and j at year t, and N is total number of countries.
6percent of its trade with the U.S., 7 percent with Ecuador, 7 percent with Venezuela
and 5 percent with Japan. Further down the line is China, which in 2000 did 19 percent
of its trade with Japan, 17 percent with the U.S., 12 percent with Hong Kong, 8 percent
with Korea and 5 percent with Germany.9 The presumption is that the volatility of the
e⁄ective exchange rate will exceed that of the bilateral exchange rate for countries that
maintain a hard bilateral peg.
Figure 1 presents scatter plots of the volatility of countries￿e⁄ective and bilateral
exchange rates. Hard bilateral ￿xers should appear below the 45 degree line and roughly
half of the countries ￿t this pattern, as e⁄ective exchange rate volatility exceeds bilateral
exchange rate volatility in 92 of the 172 countries for which we have data. Of these, 12
are OECD members.
Somewhat surprisingly, about half of the sample lie above the 45 degree line. For
these countries, bilateral exchange rate volatility may be relatively unimportant if they
do relatively little trade with the anchor country. As the data points appear randomly
distributed about the 45 degree line, there seems to be no presumption as to whether
e⁄ective exchange rate volatility dominates bilateral exchange rate volatility.10
1.2 Dynamics
We compare the dynamic behavior between bilateral and multilateral exchange rate
measures by regressing changes in the e⁄ective exchange rate on changes in the bilateral
exchange rate at various horizons as well as in the levels of the observations. The levels
observations are standardized so that the slope coe¢ cient gives us an estimate of the
correlation.11
9In 2000, the U.S.￿ s major trading partners were Canada (21 percent) and Mexico (13 percent),
Japan (11 percent) and China (6 percent).
10Countries whose e⁄ective exchange rate volatility exceeded bilateral exchange rate volatility by 50
percent (excluding those who maintained a hard ￿x throughout the sample) include Angola, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belg. Lux, Belize, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus, Czecho,
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guinea Bis, Haiti, Kuwait, Lao, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Mal-
dives, Mauritania, Neth.Ant.A, Netherland, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arab, Singapore, Slovakia, Somalia,
Suriname, Switzerland, UAE and USA. Countries whose bilateral exchange rate volatility exceeded
e⁄ective exchange rate volatility by 50 percent or more include Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cent.Af.Rep.,China, Macao, Cote d￿ Ivorie, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mali,
Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, SaoTomePri, Senegal, Seychelles,
Swaziland, Syria, Tonga, TrinTobago, Tunisia, Uganda and Ukraine.
11We standardize the levels observations because the e⁄ective exchange rate is actually an index and
is scaled di⁄erently from the bilateral exchange rate.
7Table 1 shows the percentage of countries for which slope coe¢ cient estimates indi-
cate dynamic divergence between e⁄ective and bilateral exchange rates. The coe¢ cients
for most countries exhibit large deviations from unity across the various horizons. At
the monthly horizon most of the slope coe¢ cients are positive but very small in magni-
tude. However, for many countries, the monthly change in the bilateral exchange rate is
negatively correlated with the change in the e⁄ective exchange rate since negative point
estimates are obtained for 21 of 157 available countries (13.4 percent). The discordance
between the dynamics of e⁄ective and bilateral measures of the exchange rate tends to
increase with the time horizon: Slope coe¢ cient estimates are negative for 16 (of 152
available) countries for annual percent changes, 21 (of 138 available) countries at the 4-
year horizon, and for 49 (of 157 available) countries when the regressions are performed
on exchange rate levels.
Looking only at the correlation between changes in the e⁄ective and bilateral ex-
change rates will in some cases obscure an underlying divergence in their trends, which
is illustrated in the case of Denmark. Figure 2 shows plots of the monthly percent
change, 4-year percent change and the levels of e⁄ective and bilateral exchange rates for
Denmark.12 While there has been an e⁄ective appreciation of the krone over the sample
period and a bilateral depreciation with respect to the deutschemark, ￿rst-di⁄erences in
the two exchange rate measures are positively correlated.13 The e⁄ective and bilateral
exchange rates for Canada and many European countries exhibit similar patterns (not
shown).
The descriptive statistics that we report combine experiences across regimes ranging
from hyperin￿ ation to currency board hard ￿xes. What these very aggregative summary
statistics on volatility suggest, however, is that a very di⁄erent picture about exchange
volatility exposure emerges when viewed through the lens of e⁄ective rather than bilat-
eral exchange rates.
12The reciprocal of nominal e⁄ective exchange rates are plotted. Therefore, the decrease of NEER
represents appreciation of e⁄ective rate. Both e⁄ective rates and bilateral rate are normalized in the
plot.
13Two trend-stationary series fxtg and fytg can trend in opposite directions and have positively
correlated changes if the times when both series increase xt experiences large changes and yt experiences
small changes and vice-versa when both series decrease. Suppose that yt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿yt￿1 + "t;
xt = ￿(1￿￿)+￿xt￿1 +vt; ("t;vt)
0 iid
~ (0;￿); ￿11 = ￿22 = 1;￿12 > 0; 0 < ￿; ￿ < 1: Let ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0
so that they trend in opposite directions. Denoting the deviation from the mean with a ￿ ~￿ , it follows
that the covariance between changes in xt and yt is E (￿e yt￿e xt) = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 ￿12 (2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) > 0:
82 E⁄ective exchange rate regime classi￿cations
We present the discrete choice model for the de jure classi￿cations in section 2.1. Section
2.2 discusses general features of our e⁄ective exchange rate classi￿cations with compar-
isons to alternative classi￿cations. In section 2.3, the comparison among the alternative
classi￿cations is specialized to a selected set of countries.
2.1 Modeling regime choice probabilities
The approach we follow is commonly employed to model household revealed preferences
from survey responses. We begin with a latent variable model of the determination of the
de jure classi￿cations where the ￿ true￿exchange rate regime perceived by the country￿ s
monetary authorities R￿






xit is a vector of the country￿ s characteristics and the error ￿ijt has an extreme value
distribution. Let the revealed de jure classi￿cations of the country￿ s exchange rate policy
be Rijt. Then the probability pijt that country i = 1;:::N reports itself to pursue policy












where ￿j is a vector of coe¢ cients associated with regime j which we estimate as a
random-e⁄ects panel regression.14
The regime categories in the multinomial logit speci￿cation are unordered. This has
an important advantage over an ordered response model in our context because it allows
for coe¢ cient heterogeneity across regimes. That is, we allow the impact of country
i￿ s k￿th characteristic on the choice probability to di⁄er across policy choices whereas
an ordered response model imposes homogeneity restrictions on the coe¢ cients across
regimes. With our emphasis on measurement as opposed to inference, we choose to
adopt the less restrictive approach.
The country i characteristics that we use to form xit are i) the volatility of the e⁄ec-
14A normalization with respect to one of the regimes is required for identi￿cation. We use regime 5,
which is the regime that occurs most frequently, for the normalization.
9tive exchange rate, ii) the mean absolute change (an alternative measure of volatility) of
the e⁄ective exchange rate, iii) the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, iv) the mean
absolute change in the bilateral exchange rate, and v) the volatility of the country￿ s in-
ternational reserves.15 Reserve volatility is predicted to be directly related to the ￿ ￿xity￿
in the exchange rate regime, the idea being that high reserve volatility is associated with
frequent foreign exchange market intervention and active management.
We use the estimated parameters b ￿j; j = 1:::6; to obtain the predictive probability
that a country with characteristic vector xit will exhibit exchange rate policy j. We
can then assign the regime with the highest predictive probability to the country-year
observation. Alternatively, we can use the predicted mean value to form a continuous
exchange rate stability index IDXijt =
P6
j=1 jpijt:
2.2 Some properties of e⁄ective regime classi￿cations
The distribution of the classi￿cations generated by alternative speci￿cations of the coun-
try characteristics is displayed in Table 2. Our preferred classi￿cation, described under
the heading ￿ combined,￿employs both measures of e⁄ective exchange rate dispersion
(volatility and mean absolute deviation), the mean absolute change in the bilateral
exchange rate and international reserve volatility.16 It can be seen that most of the
country-year observations lie towards the stable exchange rate region of the spectrum
being classi￿ed into categories 4 (cooperative) and 5 (limited ￿ exibility). 64 observations
are classi￿ed as hard ￿xers. The next largest classi￿cation is category 1 (independently
￿ oating), which forms 17% of the observations. Under the column heading ￿ drop bilat-
eral,￿we list the distribution of classi￿cations generated with the volatility and mean
absolute change in the e⁄ective exchange rate and reserve volatility (properties of the bi-
lateral exchange rate omitted). Here, we obtain nearly the same number of free-￿ oaters,
but many more ￿xers (categories 5 and 6). The tendency to classify country-year ob-
15Volatility is measured as the annual sample standard deviation of the monthly percentage change
in the respective variables. The mean absolute change for year t is similarly computed from the annual
average of monthly percentage changes. We note also that interest rate volatility is also an important
characteristic to determine exchange rate regimes. However, due to the data availability problem, we
lost signi￿cant number of observations in estimation, and we dropped the interest rate volatility from
the estimation problem.
16The individual coe¢ cient estimates from the multinomial logit do not have natural interpretations
in this context and are not reported. We originally performed estimation using all ￿ve variables but
because bilateral exchange rate volatility and mean absolute change measures are highly correlated
(0.94) we dropped the volatility measure. Very similar results are obtained by keeping bilateral volatility
and dropping the bilateral mean absolute change.
10servations as ￿xers is even more pronounced when we omit the e⁄ective exchange rate
and use the volatility and mean absolute change in the bilateral exchange rate along
with reserve volatility. These classi￿cations are shown under the column heading ￿ drop
e⁄ective.￿Thus using only the e⁄ective exchange rate or bilateral exchange rate results
in a dearth of countries being classi￿ed in the middle.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of our preferred e⁄ective classi￿cations along with the
de jure, LYS, and RR classi￿cations.17 In the de jure classi￿cations, the sample begins
with nearly all countries reporting to be ￿xers (categories 5 and 6). This proportion has
declined steadily over time with an increasing number of countries having moved towards
reporting themselves to be pursuing a policy of ￿ exible exchange rates (categories 1 and
2). The ￿ hollowing out of the middle￿phenomenon￿ the decline in the number of countries
reporting intermediate regimes￿ is seen only in the de jure classi￿cation.
The evolution of e⁄ective pure ￿ oaters is similar to that of de jure ￿ oaters. Very few
country-year observations are classi￿ed as e⁄ective hard ￿xers. Most observations are
placed in categories 1, 4, and 5 with a relatively large proportion of category 5 regimes
(limited ￿ exibility). There was a tendency to move away from ￿xing in the 1970s but the
proportion of ￿xers has remained stable in the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly, looking at
e⁄ective categories 5 and 6 to RR￿ s category 5 and comparing e⁄ective categories 1 and
2 to RR￿ s categories 1 and 2, the e⁄ective classi￿cation exhibits a higher correspondence
to RR￿ s ￿ natural classi￿cation￿than it does either to LYS or the de jure classi￿cations.
The distribution over time of the RR classi￿cation is relatively stable with many more
intermediate regimes than our e⁄ective classi￿cation. One possible reason for this stabil-
ity is that RR employ a 5-year window for computing exchange rate variability whereas
we (and LYS) employed a one-year window. The LYS classi￿cation consistently classi-
￿es the majority of observations into the ￿xed category. More than 70 percent of LYS
observations were classi￿ed as ￿xers in 1974 and approximately 55 percent were still
classi￿ed as ￿xers in 2000.
Table 3 shows the unconditional correlation matrix for the alternative classi￿ca-
tions and the country characteristics that we used to produce the e⁄ective classi￿cation.
Among alternative classi￿cations, our e⁄ective classi￿cations are most highly correlated
17Our e⁄ective classi￿cations are not directly comparable to RR nor LYS since they do not provide
a 6-way classi￿cation. For RR, we reversed and renumbered their 5-way classi￿cation broken down as
1) Freely falling, 2) Freely ￿ oating, 3) Managed ￿ oating, 4)Limited ￿ exibility, 5) Peg. For LYS, we
examine their 4-way classi￿cation broken down as 1) Flexible, 2) Dirty Float, 3) Crawling Peg, and 4)
Fixed. Both RR and LYS have a category for observations that are deemed ￿ inconclusive,￿which we
omitted in drawing the ￿gures.
11with RR (0.53) and are least correlated with the IMF de jure classi￿cations (0.32). As
expected, the e⁄ective regime classi￿cations are negatively correlated with both mea-
sures of e⁄ective exchange rate variability as are the RR classi￿cations. Neither LYS
nor the de jure classi￿cations appear to be systematically related to volatility in the
e⁄ective exchange rate.
None of the four classi￿cations are very correlated with reserve volatility. The corre-
lation is slightly positive for the e⁄ective, de jure and LYS and slightly negative for RR.
Increasing ￿ exibility in the e⁄ective and RR classi￿cations are associated with higher
bilateral exchange rate variability. The correlations between these variables and the de
jure and the LYS classi￿cations are relatively small.
Table 4 presents cross tabulations between the e⁄ective classi￿cation, the de jure, LYS
and RR classi￿cations. Looking at the ￿rst panel of the table, a perfect correspondence
between what countries say and what they do would result in nonzero values only on
the diagonal entries. Divergence takes the form of countries that say they ￿ oat but are
de facto ￿xers (fear of ￿ oating) and those that say they ￿x but are de facto ￿ oaters. As
can be seen, of 853 de jure ￿ oaters (categories 1-2), fear of ￿ oating is observed in 265
observations that are e⁄ectively classi￿ed as ￿xers (categories 5 and 6) whereas 84 out
of 1035 de jure ￿xers (categories 5-6) are e⁄ectively classi￿ed as ￿ oaters.
There are some notable di⁄erences between our e⁄ective classi￿cations and LYS. 63
LYS ￿ oaters (category 1) are classi￿ed as e⁄ective ￿xers (categories 5 and 6) and 74 LYS
￿xers were classi￿ed as e⁄ective ￿ oaters (categories 1 and 2). The cross-tabulation with
RR is relatively concentrated on and just below the diagonal. As we￿ ve seen before, the
overall correlation between the e⁄ective and RR classi￿cations are relatively high which
can be seen in the cross-tabulation table.
Table 5 reports the distribution of the e⁄ective classi￿cations across industrialized
and nonindustrialized countries. For nonindustrialized countries, most country-year are
assigned to category 5, re￿ ecting substantial exchange rate stability. For industrialized
countries, approximately 15 percent of the country-year observations are assigned as
￿ independently ￿ oating￿and roughly 80 percent are assigned to relatively stable exchange
rate categories 4 and 5.
The table also shows the regime assignments broken down according to whether the
country experience a crisis during the sample year. A crisis is said to occur in year t if the
country experienced a month-to-month change in its e⁄ective exchange rate exceeding
25 percent. Of 5760 country-year observations, there were 434 crisis observations, 424
of which occurred in nonindustrialized countries and 10 for industrialized countries. We
12note that our classi￿cation methodology does not automatically consign crisis observa-
tions to a free ￿ oat since as can be seen, a relatively large share of crisis country-year
observations continue to be grouped in categories 4 and above (28 percent).
2.3 Comparison of alternative classi￿cations for selected coun-
tries
How do the alternative classi￿cations compare for speci￿c countries? Table 6 gives the
evolution of exchange rate regime classi￿cations for a set of emerging market economies￿
Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Korea. For Argentina, there is some disagreement across
the classi￿cations in the early 70s. In the late 70s, our method and RR classi￿es it as a
￿ oater whereas LYS classi￿es it as a ￿xer. In the 90s the country is generally classi￿ed
as a ￿xer by each of the classi￿cation methods. In 1993, our method classi￿es Argentina
as a ￿ oater whereas the de jure, LYS, and RR methods classify it as a ￿xer. Ostensibly,
the reason that our method gives this result is that Brazil, a large trading partner of
Argentina￿ s was heading into a period of high in￿ ation and the real depreciated by 2000
percent against the dollar. This depreciation was re￿ ected in instability of the e⁄ective
exchange rate.18
For Mexico, the e⁄ective classi￿cation largely agrees with RR until the mid 1990s.
In the 1970s, LYS systematically classi￿es the peso to be more ￿ exible than the assign-
ment given by either RR or the e⁄ective classi￿cation. Similarly, for Peru, the e⁄ective
classi￿cation is largely consistent with RR. For Korea, all three de facto classi￿cations
are quite similar with each other. Throughout the sample, they consistently view the
won as being more stable than its de jure ￿ oater classi￿cation. Korea thus appears to
be a classic example of fear of ￿ oating, especially after the crisis of 1997.
We note that each of the de facto classi￿cations exhibit periods of volatility. The RR
regimes for Argentina jump from 2 to 6 back to 2 from 1984 to 1986. LYS￿ s classi￿cation
for Peru jumps from 5 to 2 to 4 between 1974 and 1976. The e⁄ective regimes switch
from 5 to 1 back to 5 between 1992 and 1994. However, our methodology also allows us
to use the estimated choice probabilities construct a continuous index of exchange rate





18The 1993 predictive probability for ￿ oating is 0.39 which is not particularly high. The respective
1993 predictive probabilities are p1 = 0:39;p2 = 0:23;p3 = 0:04;p4 = 0:00;p5 = 0:20;p6 = 0:14:
13Being a mean value, the index is seen to exhibit less volatility and fewer extreme values
than the classi￿cation data.
Table 7 displays alternative classi￿cations for the US, France, Japan, and Switzer-
land. The e⁄ective classi￿cation places the dollar in an intermediate regime and char-
acterizes it as being somewhat more stable than RR or LYS. For France, our e⁄ective
classi￿cation corresponds closely to RR by assessing the franc to be a relatively stable
currency whereas LYS often classi￿es the franc to be relatively ￿ exible. The e⁄ective
classi￿cation for Switzerland corresponds more closely to LYS than it does to RR and
all of the de facto methods classify this country￿ s exchange rate as more stable than its
de jure classi￿cation. From 1973 onwards, Switzerland can consistently be described as
having a fear of ￿ oating. For Japan, our e⁄ective classi￿cation is largely in agreement
with RR and its de jure classi￿cation as a ￿ oater whereas LYS tends to classify its
exchange rate as being somewhat more stable.
3 Exchange rate regimes and growth
In this section, we employ the e⁄ective exchange rate classi￿cations to study the relation
between the exchange rate regime and GDP growth. Our analysis centers on two ques-
tions. In subsection 3.1, we revisit the question of which exchange rate regime￿ ￿xed,
￿ exible, or something in between￿ is associated with the highest rates of growth. In
subsection 3.2 we examine whether di⁄erences between what a country says to be its ex-
change rate policy (its de jure classi￿cation) and what it does (its de facto classi￿cation)
matter for growth.
3.1 Exchange-rate stability and growth
Although there exists an extensive literature that studies the choice between ￿xed and
￿ exible exchange rates, economic theory does not have clear-cut predictions about the
impact of the exchange rate regime on growth. This is partly because the tradeo⁄
between ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates is usually evaluated in terms of the stabilization
and trade promoting properties of alternative monetary arrangements and the e⁄ect that
smoothing out cyclical ￿ uctuations and trade creation have on growth may be indirect.
Frankel (2003) discusses the tradeo⁄s along four main points.
For his four reasons to ￿x we begin with the observation that stable exchange rates
provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy. A policy of ￿xing the exchange rate
14can impose the required discipline on the monetary authorities to keep in￿ ation under
control. Second, by reducing uncertainty, maintaining stability in the currency￿ s value
can promote increased international trade and investment. Third, maintaining a ￿x
precludes competitive depreciations which can have a destructive e⁄ect on trade. Fourth,
the exchange rate will not be driven by speculative bubbles if it is ￿xed.
He also discusses four reasons why countries may want to promote exchange rate
￿ exibility. First, by allowing an independent monetary policy, policy makers retain
a tool to o⁄set adverse country shocks. Second, a ￿ exible exchange rate provides an
avenue for required relative price adjustments to trade shocks. Third, because a ￿ oating
rate regime breaks the connection between international reserves and credit creation, it
allows the central bank to be an e⁄ective lender of last resort and to retain seignorage
revenues. Fourth, the central bank would not be the target of a speculative attack on
its currency.
The weight of the evidence points towards high growth being associated with more
stable exchange rates. Some indirect evidence is provided by Frankel and Romer (1999)
who ￿nd that an increase in trade has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on per capita income,
and Frankel and Rose (2002) who present evidence that trade bene￿ts when exchange
rates are stabilized. The estimates from the latter paper imply that membership in a
currency union can raise trade with other union members by a factor of 3.19 In research
that directly examines the relation between exchange rate regimes and growth, Ghosh
et. al. (2000) and RR generally ￿nd that higher growth is associated with exchange
rate stability. Ghosh et. al. estimate the growth-rate ordering of de jure regimes (from
highest to lowest) as i) intermediate regimes, ii) ￿xers, then iii) ￿ oaters while RR report
a growth-rate ordering of i) limited ￿ exibility, ii) freely ￿ oating, iii) managed ￿ oat and
iv) peg.
LYS, on the other hand, ￿nd that the highest growth rates are associated with
￿ oaters, followed by ￿xers then intermediate regimes. Their results are driven in largely
by the experience of nonindustrialized countries￿ the growth rate of nonindustrialized
LYS ￿ oaters is approximately 1.1 percent higher than LYS intermediate and ￿xer coun-
tries. Edwards (2001), although analyzing a much smaller set of countries, ￿nds that
countries that have ￿ dollarized￿have grown more slowly than nondollarized countries.
In our analysis, we follow the literature by collapsing our six-way e⁄ective exchange
rate classi￿cation into a three categories by combining categories 1-2 (￿ oaters), 3-4
19Klein (2002) and Klein and Shambaugh (2004) ￿nd the e⁄ect on trade creation to be somewhat
smaller.
15(intermediates), and 5-6 (￿xers). We also include an analysis with the LYS classi￿cations
for comparative purposes since the e⁄ective classi￿cations contrasted sharply with those.
Table 8 provides a ￿rst look at the data by reporting mean GDP growth and volatility
sorted by exchange rate regime. For e⁄ective regime classi￿cations, intermediate regime
countries have the highest mean growth rate. Non industrialized countries with an
e⁄ective intermediate classi￿cation also have the lowest volatility in GDP growth. As
a group, e⁄ective ￿xers have the second highest growth rate and e⁄ective ￿ oaters had
the lowest growth rates. LYS ￿ oaters, on the other hand, have the highest mean growth
and the lowest volatility while LYS intermediates have the lowest mean growth rate.
Among industrialized countries, the highest mean growth rate is achieved by LYS ￿xers.
Among nonindustrialized countries, the highest mean growth rate is experienced by LYS
￿ oaters.
We now proceed to an econometric investigation. Our strategy is to consider regres-
sions of per capita growth on a set of growth control variables and a set of exchange rate
regime dummies. It is well established that investments in physical and human capital,
good macroeconomic policies, exposure to trade, and some government spending are fac-
tors that are conducive to growth. Thus, our control variables consist of i) initial year
GDP, ii) initial year population, iii) population growth, iv) the investment to GDP ratio,
v) secondary education attainment, vi) a political indicator of civil liberties, vii) trade
openness, viii) the change in the terms of trade, ix) dummies for transitional economies,
x) regional dummies for Latin America and Africa, and xi) time-speci￿c dummies. Ex-
change rate regime 1 is taken as the base, so growth e⁄ects implied by coe¢ cients on
exchange rate regime dummies are relative to the growth rate of ￿ oaters.20
We estimate random-e⁄ects panel regressions and report the results in Table 9. To
economize on space, we do not report coe¢ cient estimates for the auxiliary controls.
Here, we ￿nd that the highest growth rates are associated with de facto ￿xers. With all
countries in the sample, the coe¢ cient on the ￿xer dummy is signi￿cant and we estimate
that e⁄ective ￿xers grow a bit more than 1 percent faster than e⁄ective ￿ oaters. For
industrialized countries, the coe¢ cients on the regime dummies are positive and suggest
slower growth for e⁄ective ￿ oaters than e⁄ective intermediates and ￿xers, but these
estimates are not statistically signi￿cant. For nonindustrialized countries, we obtain a
signi￿cant estimate of the coe¢ cient on the ￿xer dummy. If this is a causal relationship,
our estimates would imply that switching from a ￿ oat to a ￿x would increase per capita
growth by 1.3 percent .
20These controls are generally the same ones employed by LYS.
16The estimates suggest a monotone relationship between exchange rate stability and
growth. Additional evidence along these lines can be obtained by replacing the regime
dummies with our index of exchange rate stability, IDXit: When we do so, we obtain
positive point estimates in the regressions that are signi￿cant in the full sample and for
nonindustrialized countries. A unit increase in the stability index (higher means more
stability) is associated with nearly a 1
2 percent increase in per capita growth.
The contrast between our results and LYS is primarily due to di⁄erences between
our regime classi￿cations and not in the data since we are able to qualitatively replicate
LYS￿ s results with our data.21 Using the LYS classi￿cations in growth regressions for
nonindustrialized countries, growth for intermediate regimes are signi￿cantly lower at
the 10% level than growth for ￿ oaters and the coe¢ cient on LYS ￿xers is negative
but insigni￿cant. Their classi￿cation method assigns a larger proportion of country-year
observations in the ￿xer category than does the e⁄ective classi￿cation used in this paper.
3.2 Words, actions, and growth
In this section, we investigate whether the di⁄erence between what a country says and
what it does matters for growth. In this analysis, we assign country-observations into 4
words and action categories.
i) {de jure ￿ oaters \ de facto ￿ oaters},
ii) {de jure ￿xers \ de facto ￿xers},
iii) {de jure ￿ oaters \ de facto ￿xers},
iv) {de jure ￿xers \ de facto ￿ oaters}.
Countries in categories i) and ii) do what they say. Countries in categories iii) and iv)
do not. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present systematic study of countries in category iii)￿
countries which they refer to as having a ￿ fear of ￿ oating.￿Fear of ￿ oating helps to explain
the ￿ hollowing-out of the middle￿hypothesis￿ that according to de jure classi￿cations,
countries are increasingly adopting either the extremes of ￿xed or ￿ oating exchange
rates and are abandoning intermediate regimes. They conclude through examination of
21There are some di⁄erences between our analysis and LYS￿ s. First, as we were unsuccessful in
obtaining LYS￿ s data, we constructed our own. Variables were constructed by conforming as close as
possible to descriptions in LYS. Second, LYS do not exactly describe their econometric speci￿cation so
there may be slight di⁄erences between our estimation methods.
17the bilateral exchange rate to an anchor currency, reserves, and interest rates that de
facto hollowing-out is much less pronounced.
Genberg and Swoboda (2004) hypothesize a performance asymmetry for countries
that do not do as they say. Category iv) countries have breached a commitment to
maintaining exchange rate stability and countries that fall into this category are hy-
pothesized to su⁄er inferior economic outcomes. Fear of ￿ oating countries (category iii)
on the other hand have not broken any such commitment. Because they deliver better
exchange rate performance than promised, they may be expected to be rewarded by
superior growth performance.
The evolution of the distribution of observations across categories is shown in Table
10. In panel A, de facto regimes are given by the e⁄ective classi￿cations and in panel
B, they are given by the LYS classi￿cations. For both classi￿cations, the proportion of
countries that fear ￿ oating has steadily increased over time, although the proportion of
e⁄ective fear of ￿ oating is consistently higher than the proportion of LYS fear of ￿ oating.
While fear of ￿ oating has become increasingly prevalent, the proportion of commitment
breakers is small (category iv) and has remained fairly stable. Both de facto measures
show that the proportion of countries who say that they ￿ oat and actually do ￿ oat has
increased over time whereas the proportion who say they ￿x and actually do ￿x has
declined over time.
Coe¢ cient estimates on the words and actions dummies from growth regressions are
reported in Table 11. The de jure ￿ oat￿ de facto ￿ oat category is taken as the base
so growth e⁄ects associated with what countries say and what they do are evaluated
relative to the growth rate of de facto ￿ oaters who say they ￿ oat. These regressions also
include the full set of control variables used in our previous regressions.
For actions determined by e⁄ective classi￿cation, we obtain positive coe¢ cients on
the ￿x-￿x category which although insigni￿cant, suggest there might be some growth
advantage for countries that say they ￿x and do relative to those who say they ￿ oat
and do. Similarly, negative but insigni￿cant coe¢ cients are obtained on the ￿x-￿ oat
category weakly suggests that countries who break their commitment to stable currency
values experience lower growth than those who say they ￿ oat and do. Where we do ￿nd
a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect is on the ￿ oat-￿x (fear of ￿ oating) dummy. We estimate
that the growth rate of countries that say they ￿ oat but maintain stable currency values
exceeds the growth rate of those who say and do ￿ oat by 0.7 percent.
There is little evidence that discrepancies between what countries say and what
they do matter for growth of industrialized countries, as none of the coe¢ cients on the
18category dummies are signi￿cant.
For nonindustrialized countries, we estimate the growth bene￿t to fear of ￿ oating to
be even more pronounced (and signi￿cant) at 1.12 percent above countries in the ￿ oat-
￿ oat category. The coe¢ cient on the ￿x-￿x category is now more precisely estimated (t-
statistic=1.61, p-value=0.053 for one-sided test), providing marginally stronger evidence
of growth advantages for countries that say they ￿x to carry through with ￿xing.
Thus, when de facto regimes are given by the e⁄ective classi￿cation, the evidence
from growth regressions are largely supportive of Genberg-Swoboda￿ s hypothesis that
bene￿ts accrue to fear of ￿ oating and the asymmetries between ￿ oating when the country
says it will ￿x and ￿xing when it says it will ￿ oat. When the de facto regime is given by
the LYS classi￿cations, none of the estimated slope coe¢ cients on the category dummies
are signi￿cant. For nonindustrialized countries, the coe¢ cient on LYS fear of ￿ oating
countries is negative.
4 Conclusion
Our e⁄ective de facto exchange rate regime classi￿cation method meets three objectives.
We have designed a method that i) uses tools that are familiar to economists, ii) can
replicated, modi￿ed, and updated in a straightforward manner, and iii) produces sensible
results. In producing the classi￿cations, we employed information contained in the
e⁄ective exchange rate. The use of the e⁄ective exchange rate in our analysis leads to
an improvement in classifying regimes and underscores the value in taking a multilateral
approach in forming a generalized assessment of national policy towards exchange rate
management.
Our investigation of the impact of exchange rate regimes and growth found that
the highest growth to be associated with de facto ￿xers. This is in line with much
of the extant literature and is consistent with research that has found trade bene￿ts
from currency blocs. Whether the growth advantages that we ￿nd are the result of
maintaining a stable currency per se or from selection of countries that are members of
trade and currency blocs is unanswered but is a problem for future research.
While the exchange rate regime adopted de facto appears to matter for growth, we
also ￿nd evidence that it matters what countries say￿ especially if the do not do what
they say. Our estimation results give the following rank-ordering of GDP growth from
highest to lowest for words and actions categories: i) de jure ￿ oaters￿ de facto ￿xers ￿rst,
ii) de jure ￿xers￿ de facto ￿xers, iii) de jure ￿ oaters￿ de facto ￿ oaters, and iv) de jure
19￿xers￿ de facto ￿ oaters. Countries may have a good reason to display fear of ￿ oating
since those that do experience signi￿cantly higher per capita growth.
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22Table 1: Percent of slope coe¢ cients in regression of e⁄ective exchange rate on bilateral
exchange rate that indicate divergence.
j^ ￿ ￿ 1j > 0:5 ^ ￿ < 0 ^ ￿ > 1
Variable (percent) (percent) (percent) Nobs
1-month change 87.3 13.4 2.5 157
1-year change 65.5 10.5 4.6 152
4-year change 68.1 15.9 8.0 138
Level 46.5 31.4 ￿ 159
Table 2: E⁄ective Exchange Rate Classi￿cations
Combined Drop Bilateral Drop E⁄ective
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
1 532 16.8 525 16.6 280 6.4
2 116 3.7 60 1.9 0 0
3 34 1.1 0 0 0 0
4 811 25.7 60 1.9 233 5.3
5 1602 50.7 2445 77.4 3634 90.0
6 64 2.0 70 2.2 234 5.3
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 4: Cross Tabulations
E⁄ective Classi￿cation
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
de jure 1 168 29 7 116 109 1 430
2 100 36 10 122 149 6 423
3 48 15 12 106 134 1 316
4 47 8 3 277 147 4 486
5 48 9 0 76 587 22 742
6 12 5 0 17 231 28 293
Total 423 102 32 714 1,357 62 2,690
LYS 1 205 44 21 230 58 5 563
2 62 10 3 70 53 4 202
3 76 27 1 56 121 1 282
4 62 12 1 112 903 49 1,139
Total 405 93 26 468 1,135 59 2,186
RR 1 140 56 3 26 41 12 278
2 55 6 10 55 6 0 132
3 163 28 6 170 182 5 554
4 74 10 14 338 337 6 779
5 39 7 1 116 636 37 836
Total 471 107 34 705 1,202 60 2,579
Table 5: E⁄ective Classi￿cations across Subgroups
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Non Industrial 431 99 18 500 1,361 63 2,472
(percent) (17) (4) (1) (20) (55) (3) 100
Industrial 101 17 16 311 241 1 687
(percent) (15) (2) (2) (45) (35) (0) 100
Non-crisis 392 60 31 785 1,561 52 2,881
(percent) (14) (2) (1) (27) (54) (2) 100
Crisis 140 56 3 26 41 12 278





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 10: Percentages of country-observations. De jure and e⁄ective de facto ￿xers and
￿ oaters tabulation.
de jure Float de jure Fix de jure Float de jure Fix
Sample Nobs de facto Float de facto Fix de facto Fix de facto Float
A. E⁄ective de facto Classi￿cation
1971-2002 2690 0.16 0.52 0.28 0.05
1971-1980 816 0.07 0.72 0.17 0.05
1981-1990 886 0.15 0.51 0.27 0.07
1991-2002 988 0.23 0.36 0.37 0.04
B. LYS de facto Classi￿cation
1971-2002 2889 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.06
1971-1980 730 0.15 0.69 0.08 0.07
1981-1990 1058 0.21 0.55 0.17 0.08
1991-2002 1101 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.05
Table 11: Growth, words, and actions
E⁄ective Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger
Words & Action Categories All Indus Non Indus All Indus Non Indus
de jure ￿x-de facto ￿x 0.473 0.019 0.644 0.214 -0.001 -0.083
(0.302) (0.318) (0.399) (0.312) (0.458) (-0.392)
de jure ￿x-de facto ￿ oat -0.433 0.208 -0.468 -0.361 0.007 -0.779
(broken commitment) (0.472) (1.172) (0.566) (0.434) (0.596) (0.528)
de jure ￿ oat-de facto ￿x 0.722 0.088 1.120 0.142 0.216 -0.250
(fear of ￿ oat) (0.289) (0.254) (0.416) (0.298) (0.242) (0.422)
R2 0.204 0.397 0.302 0.209 0.402 0.212
Nobs 1751 510 1241 1758 386 1372
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold face indicates signi￿cance at the 10 percent
level.












































































































































































































Our data set includes 180 countries, each with a unique country code (1-180). Country
code 182 represents the world, country code 181 represents residuals, or countries not
included in the 180.
Other notes: Fmr. Rep of Vietnam included as Vietnam in sample (cc 176), Fmr.
Fed Rep of Germany (West Germany) included as Germany in sample (cc 66), Aruba,
Netherlands Antilles de￿ned together as Netherlands Antilles (cc 8) until 1987, separate
thereafter, Fmr. Dem Yemen de￿ned as Yemen in sample (cc 177), East and West
Pakistan de￿ned as Pakistan in sample (cc 124)
A monthly data set extending from 1960.01 to 2002.12 was used to construct annual
volatility measures and other pieces of the annual data set. The monthly data set is
comprised of the following.
Net Reserves: (in US$) (IFS line 1L.DZF) When this data was clearly reported on
a quarterly basis (i.e., at least 2 consecutive periods), the data was interpolated
to get monthly data points. A full list is available upon request. Some data
anomalies were discovered in the raw data. Negative reserves were observed for
several months for the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon. Negative reserves
in only one month were reported for Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Ukraine. Except
for the Ukraine, these are all Central Franc Zone countries.
We note that this is not the same de￿nition of reserves as that reported by LYS.
We attempted to re-create their reserve data. They describe it as the foreign
assets less foreign liabilities and central government deposits (IFS: line 11, line
16c, line 16d). These data contained many anomalies￿ LYS reserves are negative
for 30 percent of all observations and data are partially or entirely missing for
many important countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Greece, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom). The reserve measure we
utilize has approximately 10,000 more observations than LYS.
Nominal exchange rate: 2 bilateral (US$) measures as in annual data.
Nominal e⁄ective exchange rates: Using trade weights from Comtrade data set. Addi-
tionally, to give these time series properties, they were smoothed using a 12 month
moving average (5 lags, 6 leads, including observation).
33CPI: IFS (line 64..ZF) No monthly data available for USSR, Czechoslovakia. Russian
monthly CPI data derived from IFS data (CPI change over previous period, line
64XX..ZF), and inserted into database. In Australia, Belize, New Zealand, Papua
New Guinea, Vanuatu, the CPI is reported quarterly. These quarterly data were
interpolated to obtain monthly measures using Q1 as month 3, Q2 as month 6,
Q3as month 9, Q4 as month 12.
Investment derived by using GDP (current Local currency units (LCU)) minus external
balance on goods and services minus ￿nal consumption expenditure [I=GDP-NX-
C] (all from World Development Indicators).
Population, GDP, Exports, Imports, Terms of trade (Exports as a capacity to import),
obtained from WDI.
Secondary education: WDI. Data is generally reported every 5 years in the data source
which was linearly interpolated to obtain annual observations.
Civil liberties: Following LYS, these data were obtained from Freedom House country
rankings.
34